Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2000

The State of Utah v. Jon Donald Hamling : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Joan C. Watt; Nina J. Sisneros; Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.; Attorneys for Appellant.
Mark L. Shurtleff; Utah Attorney General; Attorney for Appellee.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Hamling, No. 20000813 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2000).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/2909

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

JON DONALD HAMLING,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

:

Case No. 20000813-CA
Priority No. 2

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from a judgment of conviction for attempted possession of a controlled
substance, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i)
(1998) and Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101 (1999), in the Third Judicial District Court in and
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, Judge, presiding.
JOAN C. WATT (3967)
NISAJ.SISNEROS(6654)
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant

MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666)
ATTORNEY GENERAL
HeberM. Wells Building
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P. O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854

FILED
Utah Court of Appeals

Attorney for Appellee

9AM 3 r WP
Paiiiette Stagg
Clerk of the Court

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

JON DONALD HANDLING,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

:

Case No. 20000813-CA
Priority No. 2

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from a judgment of conviction for attempted possession of a controlled
substance, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i)
(1998) and Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101 (1999), in the Third Judicial District Court in and
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, Judge, presiding.
JOAN C. WATT (3967)
NISA J. SISNEROS (6654)
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant

MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666)
ATTORNEY GENERAL
HeberM. Wells Building
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P. O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
Attorney for Appellee

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW,
PRESERVATION

1

TEXT OF RELEVANT RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

3

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

4

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

5

ARGUMENT
POINT. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR WHEN IT SENTENCED APPELLANT IN ABSENTIA
A. THE RECORD DOES NOT DEMONSTRATE A
KNOWING AND VOLUNTARY WAIVER OF THE RIGHT
TO PRESENCE AT SENTENCING
B. THE PUBLIC INTEREST DID NOT REQUIRE THAT
HAMLING BE SENTENCED IN ABSENTIA
CONCLUSION
Addendum A: Judgment
Addendum B: Transcript of sentencing hearing
Addendum C: Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
Addendum D: Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence
Addendum E: Text of relevant rules and constitutional provisions
Addendum F: Transcript of plea hearing

6

6
14
18

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES
Crosby v. United States. 506 U.S. 255, 113 S.Ct. 748,
122 L.Ed.2d 25 (1993)

8, 9

Lowervv. State. 759 S.W.2d 545 (Ark. 1988)

12

People v. Bennett. 557 N.Y.S.2d 731 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990)

12

People v. Christopher R.. 522 N.Y.S.2d 28 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1987)

12

People v. Harris. 564N.Y.S.2d481 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991)

12

People v. Link. 685 N.E.2d 624 (111. App. 1997)

12

People v. Parker. 440 N.E.2d 131 (N.Y. 1982)
Smith v. Mann. 173 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 1999), cert, denied,
120 S.Ct. 200
State v.Anderson. 929 P.2d 1107 (Utah 1996)

15,16

15
1, 6, 7, 8,9,10,
15,16,17

State v. Fettis. 664 P.2d 208 (Ariz. 1983)

10,11

State v. Ham. 910 P.2d433 (Utah App. 1996)

2

State v. Houtz. 714 P.2d 677 (Utah 1986)

6

State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994)
Tavlorv. United States. 414 U.S.17 (1973)

2
9

ii

Page
United States v. Fontanez. 878 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1989)

15,16

United States v. Lastra. 973 F.2d 952 (D.C. Cir. 1992)

10

United States v. McPherson. 421 F.2d 1127 (D.C. Cir. 1969)
United States v. Turner. 532 F. Supp. 913 (1982)

6, 7, 8, 9
10,11, 12, 17

STATUTES. RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996)

1

Fed. R. Crim. P. 43

8

UtahR. Crim. P. 17(a)(2)

2,13

UtahR. Crim. P. 22

2,6,12,13

Utah Const, art. I, § 7

2

Utah Const, art. I, § 12

3, 5,6,7,12,13

U.S. Const, amend. XIV

3

iii

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

:

JON DONALD HAMLING,

:

Case No. 20000813-CA

Defendant/Appellant.

:

Priority No. 2

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)(e) (1996). The Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, Judge, Third District Court, Salt
Lake County, State of Utah sentenced Defendant/Appellant Jon Donald Hamling
("Appellant" or "Hamling") and entered judgment of conviction for Attempted Possession
of a Controlled Substance, a class A misdemeanor (R. 42). A copy of the Judgment is in
Addendum A.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE. STANDARD OF REVIEW. PRESERVATION
Issue. Whether the trial judge violated due process, Appellant's right to appear
and defend, and Utah R. Crim. P. 22 when he sentenced Appellant in absentia?
Standard of Review. This issue involves a question of law which is reviewed for
correctness. See State v. Anderson. 929 P.2d 1107,1110 (Utah 1996) (issue of whether
defendant was properly sentenced in absentia involves a question of law). In addition, the

ultimate issue as to whether Appellant voluntarily absented himselffromsentencing is
reviewed for correctness. See generally State v. Ham. 910 P.2d 433,438 (Utah App.
1996) (reviewing ultimate issue of whether consent to search was voluntary for
correctness). Any underlying factual findings are reviewed for clear error. See generally
State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994) (factual findings are reviewed for clear
error).
Preservation. This issue was preserved at the sentencing hearing and by
defendant's motion to correct an illegal sentence, filed six days after judgment (R. 64:2;
41-42). After indicating that Hamling was not present, the trial judge stated, f,[f]or the
record, I will, notwithstanding, I'm sure, your objection Ms. Sisneros, and for the record,
I'll note your objection, proceed with sentencing at this time" (R. 64:2); see Addendum B
containing transcript of sentencing hearing. The trial judge also entered findings of fact
and conclusions of law regarding the propriety of sentencing Hamling in absentia, a copy
of which is in Addendum C. In addition, defense counsel filed a timely motion to correct
an illegal sentence, which the judge denied; see motion in Addendum D. This issue was
therefore preserved for appeal.
TEXT OF RELEVANT RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The text of the following rules and constitutional provision is in Addendum E:
Utah R.Crim. 17(a)(2);
Utah R. Crim. P. 22;
Utah Const, art. I, § 7;
2

Utah Const, art. I, § 12;
U.S. Const, amend. XIV.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On June 7,2000, the state charged Hamling with unlawful possession of a
controlled substance, to-wit: methamphetamine, a third degree felony, and possession of a
controlled substance, to-wit: marijuana, class B misdemeanor (R. 05-06). On June 15,
2000, Hamling pled guilty to attempted unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a
class A misdemeanor, before the Honorable Anthony B. Quinn (R. 79). A copy of the
plea hearing is in Addendum F. Judge Quinn scheduled sentencing for August 4,2000
before the Honorable J. Frederick Dennis and referred Hamling for preparation of a
presentence report (R. 64:3).
Hamling appeared for the preparation of a presentence report but did not appear at
sentencing (R. 64:3). Judge Frederick sentenced him to the maximum one-year sentence
(R. 64:4).
On August 9, 2000, the trial judge signed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
(R. 38-39); see Addendum C. On August 10, 2000, defense counselfileda motion to
correct the sentence (R. 41-42); see Addendum D. On August 30,2000, the trial judge
denied the motion to correct the sentence by signed minute entry (R. 46). Appellant filed
a timely notice of appeal on August 31,2000 (R. 48).
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
According to the probable cause statement in the Information, a Salt Lake County
Sheriffs detective observed what he thought was a drug sale (R. 4). He followed one of
the vehicles to a church parking lot where the officer parked and approached the vehicle
(R. 4). As the officer approached, the driver got out, removed his shirt, opened the
passenger door, and placed his shirt inside (R. 4). While speaking with the driver, the
officer looked inside the car and saw a bag of methamphetamine on the seat (R. 4). In a
subsequent search of the vehicle, the officer found marijuana (R. 4).
As Judge Quinn ordered, Hamling went to Adult Probation and Parole for
preparation of a presentence report. As part of the preparation of the presentence report,
the investigator made contact with Handling's sister, Jana (PSR: 11). Jana indicated that
Hamling faces many challenges in life which included cognitive and mental health
challenges (PSR: 11). She felt that he needed to leam living skills and that mental health
or emotional counseling would help him be better able to live on his own and take care of
daily tasks (PSR: 11). Jana indicated that she had to help Hamling get to meetings,
appointments and court appearances, and she was not sure he could tell time (PSR:11).
Hamling lived with his mother, who took care of him, until she passed away
(PSR: 11). After his mother passed away, Hamling appears to have had a more difficult
time managing his life (PSR:9, 11, 5-6).
At the time of the PSR, Hamling had a job which he had had for two years (R. 14,
4

PSR: 10). He had been in the area for many years, had family here and had resided with
an aunt for five years (R. 12; PSR:11).
Although Hamling went to AP&P and had a presentence report prepared, he was
not present at sentencing on August 4,2000 (R. 64), Judge Frederick noted Hamling's
absence, acknowledged counsel's objection to sentencing in absentia, then concluded
"based upon defendant's failure to appear, that he has voluntarily absented himself from
these proceedings11 (R. 64:3). He afforded defense counsel the opportunity to speak on
Hamling's behalf regarding the appropriate sentence, then imposed the maximum oneyear sentence (R. 64:4).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial judge violated due process, the Article I, section 12, Utah Constitution
right to presume, and the Rules of Criminal Procedure by sentencing Appellant in
absentia. The record does not establish that Hamling knowingly or voluntarily waived his
right to presence at sentencing in this case where he was not informed that he would be
sentenced even if he were not present, and the record demonstrates that Hamling has
challenges which would interfere with his ability to appear. The critical role of presence
at sentencing requires that the right to presence not be lightly forfeited. In this case where
Appellant did not waive his right to be present at sentencing, the trial court erred in
sentencing him in absentia and the sentence must be vacated.

5

ARGUMENT
POINT. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
WHEN IT SENTENCED APPELLANT IN ABSENTIA.
The trial judge concluded "based upon defendant's failure to appear, that he has
voluntarily absented himfself] from these proceedings" (R. 64:3). The judge sentenced
Hamling to serve the maximum one-year jail sentence (R. 64:4). The prosecutor
thereafter prepared findings of fact and conclusions of law, a copy of which is in
Addendum C. By sentencing Hamling in absentia, the judge violated Utah R. Crim.
P. 22, due process and Article I, section 12, Utah Constitution as well as the Sixth
Amendment right to be present at sentencing. See Anderson. 929 P.2d at 1109-10;
United States v. McPherson. 421 F.2d 1127,1129 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Because the right to
presence at sentencing is constitutionally guaranteed, the trial judge may not proceed in
absentia unless the defendant waives the right to presence.
A. THE RECORD DOES NOT DEMONSTRATE A KNOWING AND
VOLUNTARY WAIVER OF THE RIGHT TO PRESENCE AT
SENTENCING.
Any waiver of the right to be present at sentencing "must be voluntary and involve
an intentional relinquishment of a known right." Anderson. 929 P.2d at 1110 (further
citation omitted). The burden is on the state to establish waiver, and a knowing and
voluntary waiver may not be presumed by the trial court. State v. Houtz. 714 P.2d 677,
678-79 (Utah 1986).
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policy considerations relevant to the circumstances under which Anderson failed to
appear. Because Anderson was warned of the consequences of failing to appear and had
signed a written waiver of his right to presence in which he agreed to be tried in absentia,
requiring that the defendant be warned of the consequences of nonappearance in order to
find a knowing waiver of the right to presence fits squarely within the Anderson holding.
See Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1110. Relying on McPherson. the Anderson court stated, ff[t]o
intentionally relinquish the right to be present, the defendant must have notice of the
proceedings." Id. (citing McPherson. 421 F.2d at 1130). Since the notice required in
McPherson was that sentencing would proceed without the defendant if he did not appear,
this reliance on McPherson in Anderson requires that the defendant be given notice that
the sentencing will occur even if he does not appear in order to sentence in absentia.
Requiring that a defendant be informed that sentencing will proceed without him
for there to be a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to presence is also consistent
with United States Supreme Court case law interpreting Fed. R. Crim. P. 43. See Crosby
v. United States, 506 U.S. 255,256,113 S.Ct. 748,749,122 L.Ed.2d 25 (1993). In
Crosby, the Court recognized that it cannot be assumed that a defendant who fails to
appear knows that a trial will go on without him. In fact, ,f'[s]ince the notion that trial
may be commenced in absentia still seems to shock most lawyers, it would hardly seem
he was not, the appellate court concluded that a knowing waiver of the right to presence
did not occur where the record did not show that the defendant was informed that the trial
would proceed without him. Id.
8
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unable to sentence him, the Supreme Court held that sentencing Anderson in absentia
after he had expressly waived his right to presence at trial was appropriate. Id. The
Anderson court did not consider the current circumstances, however, where a defendant
appeared at the plea hearing but was not informed that sentencing would occur without
him, then later failed to appear at sentencing.
Moreover, because presence of the defendant at sentencing is even more critical
than it is at trial, the right to presence at sentencing cannot be lightly forfeited. See
United States v. Turner. 532 F. Supp. 913, 915 (1982); State v. Fettis. 664 P.2d 208, 209
(Ariz. 1983). fl[T]he common law has traditionally required that the defendant be present
at his sentencing." Turner. 532 F. Supp. at 915; United States v. Lastra. 973 F.2d 952,
955 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (citation omitted) ("'The requirement that the defendant be present
when sentence is passed has deep common law origins.'"). Presence is of critical
importance to sentencing not only because it allows the judge to be presented with all of
the information needed for a full and fair sentencing, but also because it allows the judge
to question and admonish the defendant. Indeed, "[i]t is only when the defendant is
before the court that a reasonable and rational sentencing can take place." Fettis. 664
P.2dat209.
Presence is of instrumental value to the defendant for the exercise of other
rights, such as to present mitigating evidence and challenge aggravating
evidence, and it may also be advantageous to him that the decision maker
be required to face him. The state may have an interest in the presence of
the defendant in order that the example of personal admonition might deter
10
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justness of its judgment to announce it in public to the convicted man
himself. Presence thus enhances the legitimacy and acceptability of both
sentence and conviction.
Turner, 532 F. Supp. at 915-16 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The important
policy consideratioiis relating to presence at sentencing require that the right to presence
ill sculuiui)).', iiL
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circumstances where a defendant has expressly waived his right to be present at
sentencing. See Turner, 532 F. Supp. at 916 (citation omitted). Extraordinary
circumstances allowing sentencing in absentia may also include circumstances where the
defendant has been fully informed that sentencing will proceed in his absence if he does
not appear at the sentencing hearing. See Lowerv v. State, 759 S.W.2d 545, 546 (Ark.
1988) (court unwilling to find defendant waived the right to presence at sentencing "in the
absence of language specifically advising an accused that he is subject to being sentenced
prospectively without his being present"); People v. Link, 685 N.E.2d 624, 626 (111. App.
1997) (court requires that defendant must be "warned his failure to appear may result in
the proceedings continuing in absentia" in order to sentence a defendant in absentia);
People v. Bennett. 557 N.Y.S.2d 731, 732 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990) (court reasons that
sentencing in absentia was permissible where defendant was fiilly advised that sentencing
would occur in his absence if he failed to appear); People v. Harris. 564 N.Y.S.2d 481
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991) (same); People v. Christopher R.. 522 N.Y.S.2d 28 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1987) (same). These cases support the notion that, at the very least, a defendant must be
informed that the sentencing will occur even if he is not present in order to knowingly
waive his right to presence.
While Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) facilitates due process and Article I, section 12, Utah
Constitution right to appear and defend by allowing the defendant to speak and present
information relevant to sentencing, Rule 22(b) allows sentencing to proceed even though
12
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present, the right to presence at sentencing cannot be waived except in extraordinary
circumstances which may include circumstances where the defendant was informed that
the sentencing would be held even if he did not appear.
In the present case where Hamling was not informed that he would be sentenced
even if he did not appear at sentencing, Hamling did not knowingly waive his right to
presence at sentencing.
Additionally, the record fails to demonstrate a voluntary waiver of the right to
presence. The record shows that Hamling has emotional, mental health and cognitive
challenges (PSR). His sister indicated that he has difficulty with dates and time. Given
the presumption against waiver, the information that Hamling may be unable to tell time
and has cognitive difficulties which interfere with his ability to keep appointments, and
the lack of any other information as to the reasons for Hamling not appearing at
sentencing, the record fails to demonstrate a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to
presence.
Because the record does not demonstrate that Hamling knowingly and voluntarily
waived the right to presence, the trial judge erred in sentencing him in absentia and the
sentence must be vacated.
B. THE PUBLIC INTEREST DID NOT REQUIRE THAT HAMLING BE
SENTENCED IN ABSENTIA.
In determining whether the right to presence has been waived thereby allowing for
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(iiistit " Ibv l.iiliiijji, In .ippcai .il M'nli'iiring are remedied by requiring trial judges to exercise
their discretion to proceed in absentia h*, hi hn< in|» <br |»ui»lir fiiinr^t •«» piom'ding
[without the tit fondant] 11 against the defendant's interest in being prc&cni. Smith v. Mann,
i ,>d 73, 76 (2d Cir. 1999). cert denied, 120 S.Ct. 200: ,ee also Fontanez, JT8 F 2d at

lll'i

ensures that trial courts "vigorously safeguard" the right to presence. Fontanez. 878 F.2d
at 36.
The factors to be considered when balancing the public interest in proceeding in
absentia against the defendant's interest in being present include whether there is a
possibility that the defendant could be contacted and brought to court within a reasonable
amount of time, the difficulty in rescheduling the sentencing hearing, the burden on the
state in not proceeding, and whether there is a possibility that information relevant to
sentencing will be lost. See Parker, 440 N.E.2d at 1317; Fontanez. 878 F.2d at 36;
Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1111.
In this case, Judge Frederick erred in sentencing Hamling in absentia where the
judge did not balance the public interest in proceeding against Hamling's interest in being
present, and the record fails to demonstrate that the public interest required that Hamling
be sentenced in absentia. Hamling could have been easily contacted since he had been at
the same address for five years (R. 12). In addition, his sister, Jana, could have been
contacted and asked to make sure he appeared had sentencing been rescheduled (see
PSR). Continuing the sentencing hearing to another date would not have been difficult;
sentencing hearings take a relatively short amount of time and are often rescheduled. The
state would not have been burdened by a continuance since it presented no information
pertinent to sentencing; the state could have easily done the same thing if the sentencing
had been rescheduled. There was no threat that information relevant to sentencing would
16

hi11 lost if sentenci"*

j

-

,

••..*. : *. *.i

.. . *een prepared and

filed with the court. Since Judge Frederick i11NI („11, i i. (In e;,i.v ti on• ..iioil.Ci |uduc„ »\;is
not present when, the plea was taken and had no specific knowledge that wv the public had. no interest in maintaining him as the judge; even if a delay in sentencing
,: ..,. .
di< »K -MT: * -

oi the cast, inknuaUoh pertinent to sentencing would not be lost
*

.i

nil i<< undermined '".mice Judge l-redenck

did not sit through the trial as the Anders<>n iiuloe hml ,iinl mil

IIMH

I.ill i ilir inii

Moreover, the public interest would have been better served by continuing the
sentencing hearing so that 1 lamling could be present Requiring Hamling to "account
pnMh.h" l"«ii lln" ci'iiiic M\ I (.iila; responsibility before the judge lor lus actions better serve
society's interest in seeking no fiMim1 -/nmiiM1 bed n >• 1v»i» Hamling. See I iimei. SM
F. Supp. at 915. In addition, M[t]he ceremonial rendering -*f iudgmenl nmv

:I'M»

\ *>iMi IIHM<*

to the individual deterrent force of the sentence11 (id.), thereby furthering society's interest
in having the sentence deter future criminal conduct In this case, Hamling's presence at
senteri i ini> vi mid hiivr .IN Hiiilh liiillinnl so* ni\ ", interests \Miile also protecting his right
to presence.
Handing's fundamental, critical, interest in being present for sentencing was not
on*

, in1 i lis I lie public interest in proceeding, The trialjudge therefore erred in

"•vnlennnp liiiiiilni). in .ibsnMu iiiid (lie sentence must be vacated.
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CONCLUSION
Defendant/Appellant Jon Donald Hamling respectfully requests that this Court
vacate his sentence and remand his case for a new sentencing hearing.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3dtL day of January, 2001.

JOAN C. WATT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

NISAJ.SISNEROS
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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of the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State, 5th Floor, P. O. Box
140230, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230, and four copies to the Utah Attorney General's
Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, P. O. Box 140854, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, this 3o4L day of January, 2001.

JOAN C. WATT

DELIVERED to the Utah Court of Appeals and the Utah Attorney General's
Office as indicated above this

day of January, 2001.
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DAVID E.YOCOM
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
GREGORY L. BOWN, 0402
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7900

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW AND ORDER

Plaintiff,
-vs-

Case No. 001909844
JON DONALD HAMLING,
Hon. J. Dennis Frederick
Defendant.
The above-entitled case came before this Court for sentencing on August 4, 2000. The
State of Utah was represented by its counsel, Gregory L. Bown, Deputy District Attorney, and
the defendant, who w;i > nol present was represented by Nina Sisneros.
FINDINGS OF FACT
On June 15, 2000, defendant entered a guilty plea in the above-entitled matter to
Attempted Possession < A a < "ontrolled Substance, a Class A misdemeanor, before Judge Anthony
B. Quinn. Defendant, who was present with counsel, was referred to AP&P for a presentence
report and was given the sentencing date of August 4, 2000, at 8:30 AM before the Honorable J.
Dennis Frederick.

<m

AU^IISI

4, 2000, lire defendant failed to appear before this court for

sentencing.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Rule 22 states, ' < >n the same grounds ilinl .i defendant may be tried in defendant's
absence, defendant may likewise be sentenced in defendant's absence." Utah Rule of Criminal
Procedure 22(b).

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER
Case No. 001909844
Page 2

Because defendant and his counsel were both given personal and actual notice of the
August 4, 2000, sentencing date, and the defendant voluntarily failed to appear for his
sentencing, defendant should be sentenced in his absence. Furthermore, the defendant has
waived any right to be present by his voluntary absence after being given personal notice in open
court.
ORDER
Based upon defendant's voluntary absence, defendant shall be sentenced in abstentia for
the offense of Attempted Possession of a Controlled Substance, a Class A misdemeanor.
DATED this

Ohm

of August, 2000.

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER
Case No. 001909844
Page 3

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings Of Fact,
Conclusions Of Law And Order was delivered to Nina Sisneros, Attorney for Defendant Jon
Donald Hamling, at 424 Vast 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on the
of August, 2000.
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ADDENDUM D

FILED
iHIRD DISTRICT COURT

NISAJ.SISNEROS(6654)
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association
Attorney for Defendant
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-5444

00AUG 10 PH f: 56
JALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
n r o n r v pi
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^

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

STATE OF UTAH,

MOTION TO CORRECT
ILLEGAL SENTENCE

Plaintiff,

-vJON DONALD HAMLING,

CaseNo.001909844FS
JUDGE J. DENNIS FREDERICK

Defendant.

Defendant, Jon Donald Hamling, by and through counsel, Nisa J. Sisneros, hereby moves the
court to correct it's illegal sentence imposed on August 4,2000 pursuant to Rule 22(e) of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, State v. Waestaff. 772 P.2d 987 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), and
State v. Anderson. 929 P.2d 1107 (Utah 1996). Mr. Hamling was not present at the sentencing.
The court found that he had voluntarily absented himselffromthe proceedings and sentenced
him to the maximum jail sentence allowed by law I lowever, Rule 22(a) of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure states a defendant is entitled to "make a statement and to present any
mitigation of punishment, or show any legal cause why sentence should not be imposed". Any
imposition of sentence without Mr. Hamling's presence violated his rights to due process and to
allocution as found in the Constitution of Utah art. I, §§ 7 & 12, and the 5th, 8th and 14th

Amendments of the United States Constitution. At the time of sentencing the court was unaware
as to why Mr. Hamling was not present. He had appeared at the offices of Adult Probation and
Parole for a Presentence Report to be completed and at the time of sentencing his Pretrial Release
had not been revoked.
Rule 22 (b) allows the court to issue a bench warrant if a defendant fails to appear for
sentencing. Therefore, Mr. Hamling requests that the court correct it's sentence and issue a
bench warrant for his arrest allowing him to address the court prior to being sentenced.
Mr. Hamling requests the court set this matter for hearing.

DATED this 10th day of August, 2000
/

J. SIS)
Attorney foM)efendant

MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office,
231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 this

day of August, 2000.

ADDENDUM E

UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Rule 17. The trial.
(a) In all cases the defendant shall have the right to appear and defend in
person and by counsel. The defendant shall be personally present at the trial
with the following exceptions:
(1) In prosecutions of misdemeanors and infractions, defendant may consent in writing to trial in his absence;
(2) In prosecutions for offenses not punishable by death, the defendant's
voluntary absence from the trial after notice to defendant of the time for trial
shall not prevent the case from being tried and a verdict or judgment entered
therein shall have the same effect as if defendant had been present;

Rule 22. Sentence, judgment and commitment.
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, the
court shall set a time for imposing sentence which shall be not less than two
nor more than 45 days after the verdict or plea, unless the court, with the
concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders. Pending sentence, the court
may commit the defendant or may continue or alter bail or recognizance.
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity to make a statement and to present any information in mitigation of
punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence should not be imposed.
The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an opportunity to present any
information material to the imposition of sentence.
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in defendant's
absence, defendant may likewise be sentenced in defendant's absence. If a
defendant fails to appear for sentence, a warrant for defendant's arrest may be
issued by the court.
(c) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall
impose sentence and shall enter a judgment of conviction which shall include
the plea or the verdict, if any, and the sentence. Following imposition of
sentence, the court shall advise the defendant of defendant's right to appeal
and the time within which any appeal shall be filed.
(d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the court shall issue its
commitment setting forth the sentence. The officer delivering the defendant to
the jail or prison shall deliver a true copy of the commitment to the jail or
prison and shall make the oflBcer's return on the commitment and file it with
the court.
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an
illegal manner, at any time.
(f) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty and mentally ill, the court shall impose
sentence in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 16a, Utah Code. If the court
retains jurisdiction over a mentally ill offender committed to the Department
of Human Services as provided by Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202(l)fb), the court
shall so specify in the sentencing order.
(Amended effective January 1, 1995; January 1, 1996.)

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

Sec. 7. [Due process of lawJ
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process
of law.

Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons-]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.

CONSTITUTION OP THE UNITED STATES

AMENDMENT XIV

Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Sec. 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appoint*
ment]
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election
for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States,
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or
the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.

Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.]
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such
disability.

Sec. 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the
Confederacy and claims not to be paid.]
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law,
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in
suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the
United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any
claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations,
and claims shall be held illegal and void.

Sec. 5. [Power to enforce amendment]
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article.
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ADDENDUM A

THIRD DISTRICT COURT-SALT LAKE COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 001909844 FS

JON DONALD HAMLING,
Defendant.
Custody: Salt Lake County Jail

Judge:
Date:

ENTERED IN REGISTRY
OF JUDGMENTS

PRESENT

Clerk:

J. DENNIS FREDERICK
August 4, 2000

cindyb

P r o s e c u t o r : BOWN, GREGORY L .
Defendant not present
DATE ,.
D e f e n d a n t ' s A t t o r n e y ( s ) : SISNEROS, NISA J
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
D a t e o f b i r t h : J a n u a r y 6 , 1962

video

Tape Number:

^

1
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U
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IKIA/Nn^

IMAGED

Tape Count: 9:43-9:47

CHARGES
1. ATTEMPTED ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (amended)
Class A Misdemeanor
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 06/15/2000 Guilty Plea
SENTENCE JAIL
Based on the defendant's conviction of ATTEMPTED ILLEGAL POSS/USE
OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a Class A Misdemeanor, the defendant is
sentenced to a term of 1 year(s)
Commitment is to begin immediately.
Credit is granted for 28 day(s) previously served.
Criminal Sentence U.H~

HAMLING, JON DOr J D

Case No: 001909844
Date:
Aug 04, 2000
SENTENCE TRUST
The defendant is to pay the following:
Attorney Fees:
Amount: $200.00 Plus Interest
Pay in behalf of: LDA
The Court finds the defendant has voluntarily absented himself from
the sentencing proceedings. The Court orders defendant be committed
forthwith upon his arrest on this Court's warrant. Counsel for the
State to prepare the findings of fact and
conclusions of law and order Be absentia.

Page 2 (last)

ADDENDUM B

1

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH

2

SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
-oOo-

3
4

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

5
6
7

Case No. 001909844FS
gENTENCINg

vs.
JON DONALD HAMLING,

(Videotape Proceedings)

Defendant.

8

-oOo-

9
10
11

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 4th day of August

12

2000, commencing at the hour of 9:43 a.m., the above-

13

entitled matter came on for hearing before the HONORABLE

14

J. DENNIS FREDERICK, sitting as Judge in the above-named

15

Court for the purpose of this cause, and that the

16

following videotape proceedings were had.

17

-oOo-

18

APPEARANCES
For the State:

GREGORY L. BOWN
Deputy Salt Lake County
District Attorney
231 East 400 South, #400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

For the Defendant:

23

NISA J. SISNEROS
Attorney at Law
Salt Lake Legal Defender

24

424 F a s t: Rnn
S u i t e 300
500 South
S m i t h . Su
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20
21
22

Association
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Salt L a k E l l v . E t l h l 84111
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OCT 1 7 2000
star

ALAN P. SMITH, CSR

ORIGINAL

_

_

^ ^ ^ . , ,

385 BRAHMA DRIVE (80.) 2 6 ^ @ y R J Q F A P P E A L
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 8 4 l W W W '

£COTt£>l2>-tA

P R O C E E D I N G S

THE COURT: Ms. Sisneros?
MS. SISNEROS:

A few other matters and I don't—

he's another one of my clients, Jon Hamling, No. 20.
THE COURT:
Sisneros.

Let's go to that matter, Ms.

State of Utah versus Jon Donald Hamling, Case

No. CR009844, you're appearing in his behalf, Ms. Sisneros.
Mr. Bown, you're here for the State?
MR. BOWN:
THE COURT:

Yes.
And Mr. Jon Donald Hamling is not

here.
MR. BOWN:

(Inaudible) last him in jail. Did he

get out?
THE COURT:

Well, it shows here Pre-Trial

Services.
MR. BOWN:
THE COURT:

Okay.
For the record, I will,

notwithstanding, I'm sure, your objection, Ms. Sisneros,
and for the record, I'll note your objection, proceed with
sentencing at this time.
The defendant entered a plea of guilty on the
15th of June of this year to the Class A misdemeanor crime
of attempted possession of a controlled substance. A presentence report was ordered, has now been received and

2

reviewed.

I assume you've seen the report.
And other than his non-presence, do you have any

legal reason why we shouldn't proceed with sentencing at
this time?
MS. SISNEROS:
THE COURT:

No, your Honor.

Before I determine what's to be done

here# do you wish to say anything on behalf of Mr. Hamling?
I'm sure at some point, he would appreciate any words you
have in that regard.
MS. SISNEROS:

Yeah.

I—actually, I—I did see

Mr. Hamling a couple weeks ago and at that point, he hadn't
done his—his pre-sentence report.

I told him he needed to

come down and do it and he did do that, so to his credit,
he did listen to—to me and have a pre-sentence report done
and did show up on another case in—in court a couple weeks
ago.
Aside from that, I—not having talked to him
specifically about this case, I don't know what else to—to
say to the Court.

I would just ask that if he did do any

time, that he be credited for that time.

I don't know how

much he did.
THE COURT: All right, Ms. Sisneros.
It is the determination of this Court, based upon
the defendant's failure to appear, that he has voluntarily
absented him from these proceedings.

3

This Court has had no

1 J contact with him, through my clerk or otherwise.

I take

2 J it, Ms* Sisneros, you've not heard from the man for at
3 I least two weeks.
4

MS. SISNEROS: That's correct.

5

THE COURT:

He was advised specifically of this

6

date for appearance, both orally and in writing and

7

therefore, it is my determination that he voluntarily

8

absented himself.

9 1
10
11

Mr. Bown, I'll ask you to do the findings of
fact, conclusions of law and order.
It is the judgment of this Court that Mr. Hamling

12

be committed to the Adult Detention Center for the period

13

of one year for the Class A misdemeanor crime to which he

14

has pled guilty.

15

commenced forthwith upon his apprehension and that he be

16

ordered to pay a recoupment fee in the amount of $200 for

I will order that that service be

17 J your fine appearance in his behalf.
18 I

I don't see at this point that he's had any time

19 I served awaiting disposition originally; 28 days he did
20 J serve awaiting disposition, it appears in this matter, so
21

I'll grant him credit for 28 days that he's already served.

22 J

Thank you, Ms. Sisneros.

23

MS. SISNEROS: Thank you.

24 I

(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.)

25
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TRANSCRIBER'S CERTIFICATE
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

ss.
)

I, Toni Frye, do hereby certify:
That I am a transcriber for Alan P. Smith,
Certified Shorthand Reporter and a Certified Court
Transcriber of Tape Recorded Court Proceedings; that I
received an electronically recorded videotape of the within
matter and under his supervision have transcribed the same
into typewriting, and the foregoing pages, numbered from 1
to 4, inclusive, to the best of my ability constitute a
full, true and correct transcription, except where it is
indicated the Videotape Recorded Court Proceedings were
inaudible*
I do further certify that I am not counsel,
attorney or relative of either party, or clerk or
stenographer of either party or of the attorney of either
party, or otherwise interested in the event of this suit.
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 12th day of
September, 2000.

ftA-

^XL

Transcriber
Subscribed and sworn t o before me t h i s 12th day
o f September, 2000.
NOTARY PUBLIC
ALAN P. SMITH
385 BRAHMA DRIVE
MURRAY. UT 84107
COMMISSION EXPIRES
DEC. 4.2001
STATE OF UTAH

(

Notary Publ

SEAL)
5

REPORTER'S CERTIPTCATF
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
:

ss.

)

I# Alan P, Smith, Certified Shorthand Reporter,
Notary Public and a Certified Court Transcriber of Tape
Recorded Court Proceedings within and for the State of
Utah, do certify that I received an electronically recorded
videotape of the within matter and caused the same to be
transcribed into typewriting, and that the foregoing pages,
numbered from 1 to 4, inclusive, to the best of my
knowledge, constitute a full, true and correct
transcription, except where it is indicated the Videotape
Recorded Court Proceedings were inaudible.
I do further certify that I am not counsel,
attorney or relative of either party, or clerk or
stenographer of either party or of the attorney of either
party, or otherwise interested in the event of this suit.
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 13th day of
September, 2000.
NOTARY PUBLIC
ALAN P. SMITH
385 BRAHMA DRIVE
MURRAY, UT 84107
COMMISSIONEXPIRES
DEC. 4.2001
ftTATEOFUTAH
I

( S E A L )

i

Notary P i i b l i c

ADDENDUM F

1

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH

2

SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

3

-oOo-

4

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

5
6
7

Case No. 001909844FS

vs.

PLEA HEARINg

JON DONALD HAHLING,
Defendant.

8

-oOo-

9
10
11

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 15th day of June,

12

2000, the above-entitled matter came on for hearing

13

before the HONORABLE ANTHONY B. QUINN, sitting as Judge

14

in the above-named Court for the purpose of this cause,

15

and that the following proceedings were had.

16

-oOo-

17

A P P E A R A N C E S

18

For the State:

B. KENT MORGAN
Deputy Salt Lake County
District Attorney
231 East 400 South, #400
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111

For the Defendant:

NISA J. SISNEROS
Attorney at Law
Salt Lake Legal Defender
Association
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
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P R O C E E D I N G S

MS. SISNEROS: Jon Hamling.
Your Honor, Mr. Hamling will be pleading to an
attempted possession of methamphetaminef Class A, and Count
2 will be dismissed.
THE COURT:

Mr. Hamling, have you been provided a

plea form to read?
MR. HAMLING:
THE COURT:

Yes.

I have.

Have your read that form carefully?

MR. HAMLING:
THE COURT:

Yes.

I have.

Any questions about it?

MR. HAMLING:
THE COURT:

No questions.
Go ahead and sign it, please.

To the charge of attempted possession of
controlled substance, how do you plead?
MR. HAMLING:
THE COURT:

Guilty.
I'll accept your plea to that charge.

It#s a Class A misdemeanor.
will be dismissed.

The second charge in this case

You have only 30 days to make a written

motion to withdraw your plea for good cause.

Do you

understand that?
MR. HAMLING:
THE COURT:
pre-sentence report?

Yes.
Is this a case where we'll need a

Mr. Morgan?

2

1

MR. MORGAN:

I believe we would, your Honor.

2

THE COURT: All right. Let's get a pre-sentence

3

report from A P & P and we'll set this matter over for

4

sentencing.

5
6

THE CLERK:

That will be before Judge Frederick

on August 4th at 8:30 in the morning.

7

MS. SISNEROS: And your Honor, it's my

8

understanding that Pre-Trial is willing to take Mr.

9

Hamling.

10

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: That's correct, sir.

11 I

THE COURT:

12

MR. MORGAN:

13

THE COURT: All right. Released to Pre-Trial

14
15
16

Any objection to that, Mr. Morgan?
No, your Honor.

Services with all normal conditions that they would impose.
MS. SISNEROS: Thank you, your Honor.

That's all

I have, may I please be excused?

17

THE COURT:

You may.

18 J

(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.)
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